ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 870

Is Dualism Worth Revisiting?

Gustav Ranis
Yale University

September 2003

Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and critical
comments.
The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contribution of Michael Boozer (Yale), some
early inputs from Douglas Gollin (Williams) and the assistance of Tavneet Suri (Yale), Prateek
Tandon (Yale), and Zaruhi Sahakyan (Yale).

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic
library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=464240
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm

Is Dualism Worth Revisiting?
Gustav Ranis

Abstract
The dual economy model, built on classical foundations, served as the cornerstone of development
theory for several decades after World War II. It subsequently came under neo-classical microeconometric attack and has fallen into general disuse, at least within the Anglo-Saxon academic
establishment. This paper presents a brief intellectual history of the framework and tries to respond to some
of the criticisms that have been leveled against it—some peripheral, others central. We then proceed to
inquire into the usefulness of the dual economy model for understanding both historical and contemporary
real world situations and for development policy. We conclude by asking whether recent theoretical
developments in economics offer an opportunity for reassessing the relevance of the model.
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I.

Introduction
In the 1950s and 1960s, a neglected sub- field of economics was rediscovered:

development economics, concerned with describing the economies of the world’s poor countries,
which even then accounted for more than half of the world’s population. The economic
problems facing these countries—many of them newly independent—were clearly acute and
their development was seen as an urgent priority for both analysis and policy action.
Available economic models, however, seemed to offer only limited insights into the
practical problems facing these countries. These were not modern industrial economies; most
people worked not in factories but in subsistence agriculture or in urban informal jobs—from
shoe shining to small-scale peddling to distributive trades and artisanal crafts. The dominant
one-sector macro models of the day, from Keynesian to Harrod-Domar to Solow, seemed to have
limited relevance for societies not primarily concerned with business cycle or steady state
properties. Most contemporary growth models were seen as academic abstractions with little
policy relevance. And the dominant assumptions of neoclassical micro theory—full
employment, market clearing and perfect competition—seemed to have little relevance for the
segmented commodity, labor, and credit markets of poor countries.
Against this backdrop, the concept of dualism attracted considerable attention.
Sociological dualism, associated with the name of Boeke, 1 emphasized differences between
Western economic and non-Western cultures and objectives. Technological dualism,
emphasized by Higgins 2 and Eckaus 3 focused on the difference between variable factor
proportions in traditional and fixed coefficients in modern sectors. A third, and undoubtedly
1
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dominant strand, focused on the coexistence of sectors which are basically asymmetrical—and
thus dualistic—in some key economic dimension.
Undoubtedly the first clear manifestation of this third version of dualism appeared in the
tableau economique of the physiocrats. Although the emphasis there was on one preponderant
“productive” sector, agriculture, the physiocrats also clearly envisioned its coexistence with a
small non-agricultural (to them “non-productive”) sector, providing services, artisanal goods and
other requirements of the ruling nobility—if the “produit net” of the soil (read agricultural
surplus) was large enough to permit some labor reallocation. This essentially circular flow
mechanism may yield slow increases in real per capita income over time as the productivityenhancing results of “father teaching son” plus inter-regional specialization and an enhanced
division of labor lead to increases in agricultural productivity. But these represent limited
amendments to what is basically a static situation, with the “serfs” in the system, mostly in
agriculture, some allocated outside, continuing to maintain a virtually constant consumption
standard.
Physiocratic dualism, which emphasized the fundamental primacy of agriculture, the
importance of an agricultural surplus and the long run prognosis of stagnation, gave way to the
concept of classical dua lism, more or less coincident with the advent of the so-called industrial
revolution in Western Europe. This classical concept á la Ricardo 4 (1815) focused on the
coexistence of still overwhelmingly dominant agricultural activities subject to diminishing
returns to labor on the basically fixed land—and non-agricultural activities, growing as a
consequence mainly of the accumulation of fixed capital. While the classical school did not
model the interactions between these two sectors, it is clear that the main fuel for the reallocation
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of workers and the accumulation of industrial capital was seen as coming from the “profits” of
agricultural capitalists, i.e. the agricultural surplus left over after agricultural workers and
landlords (who were assumed to consume everything) had been paid off. It should be noted that
the classicists also introduced the related assumption of the near fixity of land combined with
Malthusian population pressures and that they retained the notion of an institutionally determined
real wage in agriculture—even though the laboring class was now free and could bargain with
the capitalists in setting the level of that wage.
While the classicists differed amongst themselves with respect to their overall prognosis
for the dual economy as a whole, Ricardian-Malthusian pessimism with respect to the
agricultural sector’s ultimate stagnation was a dominant feature of their overall analytical work.
In the absence of marked technology change, either generated within agriculture or via modern
inputs from non-agriculture, agricultural stagnation and thus the drying up of the needed
agricultural surplus represented the dominant long-term outlook. Whether technology change
and the exploration of economies of scale within the industrial sector, reflecting Smith’s
optimism, 5 would be sufficiently strong to provide enough industrial profits to rescue the
situation remained controversial.
It was, of course, Arthur Lewis who in his famous 1954 article 6 built on some of the main
ingredients of this classical tradition leading him to emphasize dualism in labor markets, i.e., a
competitive wage in non-agriculture but tied to a wage in excess of a very low, if not zero,
marginal product in agriculture. Lewis, moreover, found himself allied with Smith, seeing the
relatively small non-agricultural or commercialized sector as dynamic and expanding, fed by the
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mobilization of the “hidden rural savings” of Nurkse 7 and Rosenstein- Rodan, 8 enabling the
reallocation of workers into higher productivity activities, while wage levels were kept relatively
low, at a modest “hill” over the agricultural wage. This reallocation process would continue
until all the “surplus labor,” i.e. all those whose remuneration exceeded their marginal product,
had been reallocated, marking a turning point at which dualism atrophies and the economy
becomes fully commercialized or neo-classical.
In Section II, we will trace the further development of the dual economy model in the
Lewis tradition. In Section III we will examine the criticisms which have been leveled against it
by the neo-classical school, differentiating between what may be referred to as popular “red
herring” attacks and more central critiques. Section IV will inquire into the current normative
usefulness of the concept for both analytical and policy purposes. Section V concludes.

II.

The Modern Dimensions of Dualism
We will concentrate here on dualism in the labor market and, for reasons of convenience,

restrict ourselves to the closed economy—relevant to all but very sma ll economies. 9 Dualism, of
course, matters only when an economy’s agricultural sector is initially relatively large and
represented substantially by extended family or collective farm cultivation, often labeled
“subsistence agriculture,” in contrast to commercialized or plantation agriculture.
The critical organizational characteristics of this sector is that, at a given technology, the
man/land ratio is such that marginal labor productivity is very low (if not zero or negative), while
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key decision makers such as heads of families, village elders or commune leaders feel obliged to
share output with all members of these groups, even if such shares exceed the marginal product.
In other words, income is shared, or an institutional wage is determined based on bargaining
rather than neo-classical principles. Moreover, the gap between this institutional wage in noncommercialized agriculture and the commercialized non-agricultural wage is likely to be in
excess of the modest 50% “hill” asserted by Lewis and is materially affected by such
institutional urban formal sector interventions as minimum wage legislation, union pressure and
government wage setting. Extending the Lewis model further, there are likely to exist similar
configurations in the so-called urban informal sector, with family enterprises lacking sufficient
cooperating capital and forced to pursue service sector and distributive trade activities which
yield low marginal labor productivities but are again characterized by a similar pooling of
income in an extended family context. In both cases everyone “in the same kitchen” is fed and
average, rather than marginal, product is relevant to the size of the shares.
In addition to the organizational dimensions of dualism, emphasized by Lewis, there is a
product dimension, focused on the exchange between food produced by the peasant agricultural
sector and the non-agricultural goods produced in the urban (and/or rural) commercialized nonagricultural sector. The inter-action between these two sectors, extending beyond the intersectoral labor market into the inter-sectoral commodity and financial markets, was fully analyzed
by Fei and Ranis. 10 The key point here is that agricultural and non-agricultural products cannot
readily be substituted for each other; in the closed economy food-producing agriculture becomes
a necessary condition for industry, while the converse does not hold. Consequently, if
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agriculture lags behind non-agriculture during the labor reallocation process the deterioration of
the non-agricultural sector’s terms of trade may well cause a rise in the agricultural wage, as well
as in the related unskilled non-agricultural real wage, and a consequent retardation if not collapse
of the labor reallocation process long before the labor surplus has been eliminated. This “turning
point,” in contrast to Lewis’, signals the relative inability of the system to follow a “balanced
growth” path according to which agricultural productivity keeps pace with advances in nonagriculture and inter-sectoral commodity as well as financial and labor markets can clear at given
terms of trade.
Other modifications of the basic Lewis model can be found in Harris-Todaro 11 and
Fields. 12 While Harris-Todaro’s main innovation was to introduce the notion that labor
reallocation is affected not only by the inter-sectoral wage gap but also by the probability of
obtaining a formal sector non-agricultural job; they accepted the notion of an institutional impact
on the level of the non-agricultural urban wage but insisted on an equally competitive, i.e., neoclassical, agricultural wage. Fields, however, pointed out that the two choices for migrants
offered by Harris-Todaro, a formal sector job or open urban unemployment, needed to be
amended by introducing the urban informal sector. Indeed, just as in agriculture, very few urban
residents can afford to be openly unemployed and rely on non-existent unemployment insurance.
Instead, they fall back on the family, while working at very low levels of productivity, i.e. they
are the urban underemployed.

11

Harris, J. and M. Todaro (1970), “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two Sector Analysis,”
American Economic Review, 40, 126-142.
12
Fields, G.S. (1975) “Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment and Job Search
Activity in LDC’s,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 165-188.

6

Finally, Ranis and Stewart13 further amended the basic dualistic model by suggesting the
need to trace the interactions among four sectors once we further disaggregate the urban informal
sector between a non-traditional dynamic sub-sector, with sub-contracting ties to the urban
formal sector, and a traditional static sub-sector, serving as a low productivity sponge. The very
meaning of “dualism” of course becomes somewhat tenuous as we move away from the basic
two-sector Lewis model but, even though inter-sectoral relations become increasingly mindblowing to trace, the basic asymmetries in labor market behavior remain critical for both
analytical and policy purposes.

III.

Neo-Classical Critiques and Responses
Dualism has been subjected to much criticism and attack over the past several decades. It

has virtually disappeared from contemporary development discourse in the OECD countries,
except via textbooks including intellectual history. Some of this may be termed not so much
malign neglect as a consequence of the development sub-discipline, along with the rest of
economics, moving away from grand macro-theorizing to a micro-econometric focus. But much
of the attack has also focused quite specifically on the theory of dualism because of its
“unacceptable” assumptions about labor market behavior. In spite of its apparent real world
empirical relevance—on which more below—the critics reject out of hand any bargaining
outcome which cannot be modeled precisely within a neo-classical framework.
Some of the specific critiques on record may be viewed as “red herrings” and can be
readily responded to; others are more profound and require more careful consideration. Perhaps
the leading attack in the “red herring” category was occasioned by the unfortunate choice of the
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“labor surplus” term deployed by Nurkse, Lewis, Fei-Ranis and others. This was widely
interpreted as implying a zero marginal product in agriculture and led to the famous T.W.
Schultz/Sen exchange 14 on whether or not a reallocation (or in this case demise) of part of the
agricultural labor force could be expected to leave agricultural output unaffected. This
misperception arose due to incautious asides in Lewis’ 1954 paper and mainly due to
mathematical convenience in Fei/Ranis’ 1961 and 1964 contributions. The basic point is that the
marginal product is low, and sufficiently low to fall below the bargaining wage or income share.
As Lewis put it in his 1972 retrospective piece 15 “whether marginal productivity is zero or
negligible is not at the core of fundamental importance to our analysis…this has led to an
irrelevant and intemperate controversy.” But the controversy has persisted. Otsuka in his review
of Fei/Ranis’ 1997 book 16 considers the zero marginal product notion as deeply embedded in the
dual economy model but acknowledges that such a stark assumption is both empirically unlikely
and theoretically unnecessary. What is necessary is that, during any short period of time, there
exists an excess supply of labor at the going wage.
Does this mean that the reallocation of labor necessarily causes a food shortage, or the
arrival of the Fei-Ranis “shortage point?” Again, as Fei-Ranis took pains to point out, a
withdrawal of labor is highly likely to lead to a simultaneous reorganization of agricultural
production, in effect an upward shift in agricultural labor productivity, permitting the
maintenance, if not even an increase, of the agricultural surplus available for transfer to non-
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agriculture. Thus, the inter-sectoral terms of trade need not deteriorate against industry—unless,
of course, there is a marked relative neglect of agriculture in the “balanced growth” context.
A second critique, again in the “red herring” category, dealt with the level of the
exogenously given institut ional wage. The neo-classical school, of course, fundamentally rejects
the notion of an institutional or bargaining wage since it cannot be deduced from basic
principles. But the fact that wages are, in fact, observed as not constant over time can be easily
disposed of. Otsuka 17 , for example, claims he has “never encountered institutionally determined
rigid wage rates in agrarian communities”. This ignores the fact that it is the sharing rule, not the
level of a wage, which may well vary over time, which is at stake. The dual economy
assumption is that agricultural wages are related to, but not necessarily equal to, the average
product of agricultural workers, since the head of the household, or whoever else commands the
agricultural surplus, is bound to retain a portion for her own reinvestment purposes. As the
average product rises with technical change, the agricultural bargaining wage is also likely to
change. Thus, over time, we are likely to see a gently rising, not a horizontal, Lewis-type supply
curve of labor. Over short periods of time it is horizontal; but what we have over longer periods
is a step function made up of annual unlimited supply of labor segments, econometrically
undistinguishable from a gently rising supply curve.
Let me cite, in passing, a few other criticisms of some assumptions of the dualism model,
all of which have some validity but none of which are critical one way or the other. They
include the adoption of the classical assumption that all wages are consumed and all profits are
saved; that the system is savings-pushed, i.e., that Say’s Law holds; and that all investment funds
are allocated to the commercialized or non-agricultural sectors. There would be absolutely no
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problem in modifying any of these simplifying assumptions without any damage to the basic
dualistic model.
Let us then turn to the crux of the critique, the rejection of a bargaining wage or
consumption share exceeding the marginal product of labor at any point in time. I assume it is
not difficult to see tha t in the kind of setting under discussion, i.e. extended family or other
communal institutional arrangements, the unfavorable ratio of people to cooperating factors as
part of the initial condition is not something under the control of decision makers, and that such
decision makers cannot simply fire low productivity members to reach a neo-classical
equilibrium or refuse to share much of the group’s income with them. Fafchamps18 provides an
overview of the principles underlying the resulting “solidarity network” among peasants as
depicted in the anthropological evidence of Geertz19 and Scott. 20 Ishikawa, 21 an astute long-time
observer of Asian economic development, endorses the concept of a “minimum subsistence level
of existence” (MSL), one version of the ins titutional real wage. His work indicates the
prevalence of a “community principle of employment and income distribution which promises
all families…..an income not less than MSL.” Hayami and Kikuchi22 find that in Indonesia
“wages do not adjust on the basis of labor’s marginal product, but according to the subsistence
requirements of the time and social conventions.” Only over time is there a tendency to adjust
but even then it does not necessarily occur by altering wages to equal the marginal product,
which could reduce the wage below subsistence. Instead, in Java harvest contracts began to

18

Fafchamps, M., (1992), “Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral
Economy,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41, 147-174.
19
Geertz, Clifford (1963), Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, University of
California Press.
20
Scott, J.C. (1976), The Moral Economy of the Peasant, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
21
Ishikawa, S. (1975), “Peasant Families and the Agrarian Community in the Process of Economic Development,”
in L. Reynolds, (ed.), Agriculture in Development Theory, (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).
22
Hayami, Y. and M. Kikuchi (1982), Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, p. 217

10

include weeding duties without a complementary rise in the wage rate, thereby not threatening
the MSL but moving institutionally towards equilibrium. Osmani23 presents a model of
downward rigidity of the sharing rule insisted on by the workers themselves. Current work in
what is called behavioral economics may also prove to be of help in developing a theoretical
structure to rationalize cross-worker subsidization in the absence of assured reciprocity—
especially as some members of the group are likely to be leaving agriculture over time.
Finally, we have ample historical evidence, e.g. for England from 1780 to 1840, 24 for
Japan from 1870 to 1920, 25 for Taiwan from 1950 to 1970 26 , of labor abundant agriculture
witnessing hefty increases in average agricultural labor productivity, while the agricultural wage
rises only gently, i.e., lags substantially behind, until the commercialization or Lewis turning
point is reached. As Sen27 has pointed out, even a horizontal supply curve of labor can be made
consistent with a neo-classical explanation; but you have to work hard to make the pre-conceived
theory fit the facts. And these facts are also fully consistent with an institutional wage which is
gently rising as a result of the step function process previously described until, as in the country
cases cited above, the turning point is reached and wages begin to rise steeply in concert with
rising marginal productivity. But before that point is reached, a rising gap between agricultural
productivity and wage levels is certainly not consistent with neo-classical assumptions about
market clearance.
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Rosenzweig28 and others have presented micro-econometric evidence of steeply rising
labor supply curves in a cross-section in heavily populated agricultural settings such as India and
claim that this puts the final nail into the coffin of the classical dualistic model. However, this is
an expressly static relationship and does not address a developing economy’s dynamic transition
process. Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere 29 we would expect individual family labor
responses to be quite inelastic at any point in time. Faced with hypothetical wage changes, hardworking, if not highly productive, agricultural family workers are not likely to have much room
for trading off leisure for additional work. Rosenzweig’s findings are inherently reasonable but
they address a different issue. He is concerned with the cross-sectional labor/leisure decisions
across agricultural households, while dualistic models are interested in the conditions governing
inter-sectoral labor reallocation in a time series context.

IV.

Does the Dual Economy Model Still Serve a Useful Purpose?
Even if it were accepted that dualism is a useful construct for understanding the historical

development experience of a number of countries, including England, Japan, and Taiwan, among
others, does it have any empirical relevance for today’s world; and even more importantly, how
does it relate to contemporary theorizing in the “new growth theory” or “new institutional
economics” traditions?
We would contend that China, India, Bangladesh, as well as much of Central America
and some portions of South America, comprising a majority of the people on earth, still meet the
initial conditions for dualism relevance, i.e., a substantial food producing agricultural sector
marked by heavy population pressure on scarce land, complemented by large urban informal
28
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sectors. And, while Sub-Saharan Africa was once described as “land surplus,” there is
increasing evidence, from high fertility rates, changing cultivation practices and a general
reduction of fallow periods, that this pivotal region is also moving in the same direction. In these
settings the issue addressed with the help of the dualism model, i.e., how to mobilize an
agricultural surplus by reallocating an underemployed labor force into efficient non-agricultural
pursuits, remains at the top of the development agenda.
The dualistic theory nexus, moreover, remains useful for a number of analytical reasons,
including concerning the relationship between growth and the distribution of income, for the
determination of the domestic inter-sectoral terms of trade, as well as for the choice of
technolo gy and of the direction of technology change. The effort to understand the relationship
between growth and the distribution of income was first brought to our attention by Simon
Kuznets in 1955 30 . While Kuznets emphasized the structural change an economy experiences as
it shifts from initially dominant A (agriculture) to M (manufacturing) and S (services) sectors
over time, his explanation of the famous inverted U-shaped pattern between growth and
distribution embraced the dualistic model. The basic cause for the initial worsening of
distribution was the reallocation of workers from a more equally distributed agricultural sector to
a less equally distributed non-agricultural sector--with wages kept relatively low and savings
rates rising--while the eventual improvement of equity is related to the upswing of real wages as
full employment is reached everywhere. Bourguignon and Morrison31 see “the persistence of
economic dualism as a powerful explanatory factor of cross-country differences in inequality.”
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While work by Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 32 Fields 33 and others has shown that no inevitability should
be attached to the suggested inverse U-shaped path, it is clear that the nature of the growth
pattern viewed in an expressly dualistic context determines its relationship to equity over time,
differing markedly between the period before and after the commercialization point.
This concern about the relationship between growth and equity eventually spilled over
into a focus on what is happening to poverty levels. 34 The notion of only gently rising real
wages in both agriculture and non-agriculture during the pre-commercialization epoch affects not
only labor, commodity and financial exchanges between the sectors but also has a definite
impact on technology, favoring labor- intensive technology choices statically and labor-using
technology choices dynamically. The reversals in these dimensions once a system enters the onesector neo-classical world has also been documented. 35 In all these instances the acceptance of
initial asymmetry between sectors rather than the neo-classical assumptions of full employment
and smooth homogeneity can prove helpful to open- minded analysts.
The pattern of the inter-sectoral terms of trade provides an indication of whether or not
the dual econo my has managed to maintain “balanced growth” and avoided the relative
agricultural neglect much discussed in the literature. Finally, we should also note the relevance
of dualism for contemporary mainstream development models. The “informal insurance”
mechanism of Townsend 36 for example, by which farmers smooth consumption by insuring each
other across space is not radically different from the aforementioned “moral peasant” of Scott37
(1976) who is concerned with supporting others over time as well as space. Whether this can all
32
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still be forced into a comforting neo-classical bottle or approaches institutionalized altruism, of
course, remains a point of contention. In the former income is allocated ex post after neoclassical distribution rules are observed, whereas in the latter income is divided ex ante among
the members of the extended family or wider community. It is unclear whether the policy
implications for achieving a successful transition to modern growth differ widely depending on
which concept is deployed. But what remains relevant is which model fits better the basic
empirical reality of wage behavior relative to agricultural productivity change in successful
countries; which is better suited to analyze agricultural neglect in failure cases; which provides a
better explanation of the marked rise in a system’s savings rate; which is more capable of
explaining discontinuities in income distribution and technical choice--one that assumes full
employment and smooth neo-classical equilibrium everywhere or one that recognizes initial
underemployment and disequilibrium in the system en route to a one sector modern growth
epoch.

V.

Conclusion
The interaction between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors resides at the heart

of early stage development in many developing countries. We have in this paper argued that
dualism, especially focused on its labor market dimension, continues to offer a theoretically
valid, empirically relevant, and practically useful framework for dealing with this issue.
After briefly tracing the intellectual history of dualism, we cited and responded to various
neo-classical critiques, distinguishing between those which can be characterized as of the “red
herring” or straw man variety and those which are more fundamental and thus need to be
seriously addressed.
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The key assumption at issue is the acceptance or rejection of an institutional or
bargaining real wage or income share as an imposed initial condition for an agricultural sector
composed largely of owner/cultivators and, given very high man/land ratios, resulting in low
levels of marginal productivity. A wage above this marginal product agreed to by the family, the
community or the commune, whatever the organizational configuration--and whether in
agriculture or in informal urban sector activities--is likely to be related but not equal to the
average product--and that is difficult for adherents to the dominant neo-classical school to
swallow. We have tried to respond to various criticisms, including the interpretation of surplus
labor as zero marginal product labor, instead of simply indicating the existence of disguised
unemployment, i.e., income or consumption shares exceeding the marginal product. We have
characterized the supply curve of unskilled labor in agriculture and the informal urban sector as a
step function composed of horizontal portions, each indicating the “unlimited” availability of
labor for commercialized sector absorption over any short period of time. Concerning the more
serious challenge to the dualism model, the finding of an inelastic supply curve of agricultural
labor, our response was two- fold: that we see no inherent conflict between cross-sectional
micro-econometric findings in the neo-classical tradition and dualism’s effort to trace the
dynamic time series of the inter-sectoral reallocation process at the macro level over time;
second, that we find it not surprising that individual agricultural workers, even if underemployed
due to the lack of cooperating factors, work long hours and have very little leisure left to
surrender in response to a higher wage.
We, finally, inquired into the usefulness of the dualism concept for explaining both
historical and prospective country development experience, as well as its relevance in general to
contemporary economic modeling efforts. We found that the basic dualism model well fits the
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historical experience of such countries as England, Japan, and Taiwan and believe it is likely to
continue to be relevant for China, India, parts of Africa and Latin America, among others. We
believe, moreover, that there is ample room for further exploring the relationship between neoclassical insurance and classical altruism models as well as for forging better connections
between the new behavioral economics and a revived application of dualism to both
development theory and policy in large portions of the developing world.
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